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I. Introduction 
The protection afforded to different legally-defined objects may overlap when 
different regimes apply to the same object. This article focuses on the overlap of 
two protective regimes, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and international 
investment agreements (IIAs)1, as applied to certain intangible objects, such as an 	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Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resouce Governance (C-EENRG) ; Of Counsel, LALIVE. The opinions 
expressed in this article are my strict academic capacity. 
1  We use the term IIAs to encompass bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements with investment 
chapters (unless otherwise specified, we only refer to the investment chapters of FTAs). 
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invention, a distinctive mark or the expression of an artistic work. More 
specifically, we analyse the interactions between the different regulatory layers 
and provisions that govern the possibility of bringing IPRs under the protection of 
IIAs.  
‘Protection’ in the context of IPRs law generally means that right-holders are 
granted the right to exclude others from the use of the covered intangibles. They 
essentially grant a ius prohibendi. Under IIAs, ‘protection’ has a different 
meaning: it provides right-holders the legal power to seek compensation for 
adverse acts/omissions by a sovereign State regarding IPRs recognized in its 
territory. Thus, while IPRs protect an asset against acts (infringement) by third 
parties, the ‘protection’ under IIAs is conferred against actions/omissions by 
States, such as direct or indirect expropriation or other impairments. 
Infringements by third parties may, in some cases, amount to an omission by a 
State in breach of an IIA, but the primary target of the two ‘protective’ 
frameworks is different. However, the interaction between intellectual property 
protection and that offered by investment law is important because, according to 
the stance one takes on it, the room to successfully challenge national decisions 
relating to the eligibility for or the scope of protection under IPRs could be 
significantly affected. Such a potential impact, together with the sense of reality 
given by some foreign investment claims brought to protect IPRs,2 explains the 
increasing attention paid to this question in the last years, including in this 
journal.3  
The purpose of this article is to focus on this interaction in order to clarify its 
legal implications. This question has been rather neglected so far with most of the 
literature focusing on either mapping the references to IPRs in investment 
agreements or on the substantive protection afforded to them by investment 
disciplines.4 Yet, the intermediate step between these two stages or, in other 
words, the provisions forming the ‘gate’ to the protective framework of the IIA 
remain to be systematically analysed. Different understandings of the interactions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  See Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. 
(Uruguay) v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (‘Philip Morris v Uruguay’) (pending); Philip 
Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12 (‘Philip Morris v. 
Australia’) (pending); Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/14/2 (‘Eli Lilly v. Canada’) (pending). See also Shell Brands International AG and Shell Nicaragua S.A. v. 
Republic of Nicaragua, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/14, Settlement agreed by the parties (12 March 2007), AHS Niger 
and Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. v. Republic of Niger, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/11, Award (15 July 2013) 
and, although it does not relate specifically to IPRs , Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award (25 August 2014) (‘Apotex v. United States’). 
3  See Brian Mercurio, ‘Awakening the sleeping giant: intellectual property rights in international investment 
agreements’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 871. See also, among an increasing number of studies: 
Carlos Correa, Bilateral Investment Agreements: Agents for new Global Standards for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights?, GRAIN Study, August 2004; Simon Klopschinski, Der Schutz geistigen Eigentums durch 
völkerrechtliche Investitionsschutzverträge (Carl Heymanns, 2011); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Investment Law and 
Intellectual Property Rights’, in Bungenberg et al (eds), International Investment Law (Munich/London: C.H. 
Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2015), pp. 1692-1713. 
4  See studies by Correa, Mercurio, Grosse Ruse-Khan, above n. 3; UNCTAD, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in 
International Investment Arrangements’, in IIA Monitor 01 (2007), International Investment Agreements, 
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/1; Rachel Lavery, ‘Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment 
Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of Definitions in a Sample of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade 
Agreements’ (2009) 6 TDM, 1, 4–7 and Annex 1; Lara Liberti, L. (2010), ‘Intellectual Property Rights in International 
Investment Agreements: An Overview, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2010/01, OECD 
Publishing; Bertram Boie, ‘The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights through Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is 
there a TRIPS-plus Dimension?’, NCCR Trade Regulation - Working Paper No 2010/19 (November 2010).  
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among such provisions are possible and each has its own non-trivial legal 
implications. After some general remarks on the references to IPRs in investment 
agreements (II), we focus on three main understandings (III), namely delegation 
(by an investment agreement to domestic law), autonomy (of the definition of 
IPRs in investment agreements), and articulation (of all the relevant regulatory 
layers to circumscribe the scope of the legally-protected object). In a final section, 
we draw some conclusions with a view to guide current and future practice (IV). 
II. Circumscribing the question 
References to IPRs are pervasive in IIAs, whether in bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) or in the chapters on investment protection of bilateral or multilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs), particularly those signed by the United States.5 Much 
attention has been devoted in the literature to such references from a trade and 
investment perspective.6 It will therefore suffice to draw upon the main empirical 
findings of existing studies in order to introduce four analytical distinctions that 
will facilitate the subsequent legal analysis. 
A first distinction can be made between, on the one hand, provisions in FTAs 
that seek to confirm or expand the minimum standards on IPRs protection arising 
from the TRIPS Agreement7 and, on the other hand, provisions in IIAs that refer 
to IPRs as ‘investments’. The first category includes both ‘vertical’ obligations 
(the requirement to adopt domestic laws to give effect to certain standards or to 
adhere to certain treaties on IPRs and, thereafter, introduce the ensuing domestic 
laws) and ‘horizontal’ obligations dealing with  ‘treatment’ and focusing on non-
discrimination in IPR protection. By contrast, the protective framework of IIAs 
(whether bilateral investment treaties or investment chapters in FTAs) only 
contains ‘horizontal’ obligations requiring a certain treatment, such as non-
discrimination, ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard or the protection against 
illegal or uncompensated expropriation. 
Within the provisions of IIAs, a second distinction can be introduced according 
to how IPRs are brought within the definition of the term investment. Aside from 
some variations in language, four main possibilities are relevant for our analysis, 
as they may have different legal implications. First, the investment agreement 
may make no express mention of IPRs, referring simply to ‘property’ or ‘assets’ 
of different types. Second, the treaty may contain only a general reference to IPRs 
or to ‘intangible property’, without going into further detail. Third, the reference 
to IPRs may be more specific including an enumeration of the intangible assets 
covered, whether or not the list is explicitly characterised as non-exhaustive, and 
whether or not it makes reference to intellectual assets that are not generally 
protected as IPRs (e.g. unregistered designs). Fourth, the definition of IPRs may 
or may not refer explicitly to domestic (or international) law.8 References to IPRs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  For overviews see studies by UNCTAD, Lavery and Liberty (OECD) above n. 4. 
6  See studies mentioned above nn. 3 and 4. 
7  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299 (‘TRIPS 
Agreement’). 
8  Note that in this case the reference to domestic (or international) law is relevant for the definition of investment and 
not to determine whether an asset qualifying as an investment is protected or not under the treaty (which is a question 
of jurisdiction or admissibility). This question is further discussed in section D below. 
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may be relevant to define the term investment or to determine whether an asset 
may qualify as a ‘covert’ or ‘protected’ investment under the IIA. 
The latter point introduces a third distinction between provisions that are 
relevant for the definition of ‘investment’ and those that circumscribe the scope of 
‘protected’ investments. Assets clearly constituting investments may be excluded 
from protection, either generally or specifically (e.g. for some particular 
advantages offered by a treaty, such as access to the ICSID system), for a variety 
of reasons, including their territorial dimensions or their legality/illegality under 
the broader domestic legal framework. Limitations to protection are highly treaty- 
and fact-specific and their concrete operation is sometimes unsettled. Yet, this 
distinction remains important to explain why some IPRs, while qualifying as 
‘investments’, may not benefit from some or all of the advantages arising from an 
IIA. 
A fourth and final distinction may be useful to further circumscribe the object 
of this article. Whereas the preceding two paragraphs refer to provisions that 
define the term investment and clarify the requirements for investments to benefit 
from the protection of a given treaty, as noted in the first paragraph, the main 
contents of IIAs concern the substance of such protection (i.e. investment 
disciplines) and the procedures through which it can be claimed (typically, an 
investor-State arbitration clause). Such protection may entertain complex 
interactions with domestic and international IPRs law.9 Much attention has been 
paid to common exceptions to non-discrimination standards in IPR protection, 
whether arising from the TRIPS or from FTAs granting TRIPS-plus advantages, 
and their relevance under unqualified non-discrimination disciplines in investment 
agreements.10  
This article focuses primarily on the first type of provisions, i.e. the ‘gate-
provisions’ (dealing with definitions of ‘investment’ and with the extent to which 
they qualify as ‘covert’ or ‘protected’ investments) that condition access to the 
protection offered by the second type of provisions (relating to ‘treatment’ 
obligations). Rather than simply mapping gate provisions, our purpose is to 
systematically analyse their operation under different analytical prisms that are 
often implicit both in their wording and, more importantly, in the way they are 
interpreted by investment tribunals. In what follows, after briefly introducing the 
three main approaches through which the interaction among different types of 
gate-provisions can be understood, we focus on each approach spelling out its 
legal implications for IPRs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  As noted earlier, the literature surveyed (see above n. 4) typically analyses the extent of IPR protection under different 
investment disciplines, such as non-discrimination standards, the fair and equitable treatment standard, or 
expropriation clauses, and whether such protection goes beyond TRIPS-standards or domestic law standards. Some 
other studies have a narrower scope focusing on specific forms of State action (e.g. compulsory licensing) as potential 
breaches of investment disciplines. See e.g. Carlos Correa, ‘Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade 
Agreements: Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses’ (2004) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 
331; Tsai-Yu Lin, ‘Compulsory Licenses for Access to Medicines, Expropriation and Investor State Arbitration under 
Bilateral Investment Agreements – Are there Issues beyond the TRIPS Agreement?’ (2009) 40 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 152; Christopher Gibson, ‘A Look at the Compulsory License in 
Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation’ (2010) 25 American University International Law Review 
357. 
10  See e.g. Correa, above n. 3 (regarding national treatment) or, more generally, Boie, above n. 4. 
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III. Intellectual property rights as protected investments 
A. Three approaches 
If IPRs and investments as legally-defined objects interact to a significant extent 
and such interaction may condition access to the protective framework offered by 
IIAs, then it becomes important to understand how to address this interaction from 
a legal standpoint. There is some discussion in the aforementioned literature, often 
prompted by allegations made in investment disputes, as to the proper manner in 
which the interaction of investment law and IPR law must be framed, but no 
attempt has been made so far to address this question specifically and 
systematically.  
The views expounded in this article can be concisely stated, namely (i) that 
there are three main possible characterisations or legal approaches to frame this 
interaction, (ii) that each approach has its own non-trivial legal implications for 
the question of whether and to what extent IPRs can benefit from the protection of 
IIAs, and (iii) that the approach followed is not entirely in the hands of treaty 
drafters as it largely results from different interpretations admitted by similar 
wording. We also take position, in our concluding section, on what we see as the 
approach that is most consistent with international law, preserves the regulatory 
power of the host State and protects the legitimate interests of investors. 
The first approach is to consider that defining ‘investment’ and circumscribing 
what investments benefit from protection amount to a delegation or a referral 
(some speak of a choice of laws rule11) to the domestic laws defining IPRs and 
their scope of protection. The second approach is to consider that terms such as 
‘investment’, ‘IPRs’, know-how or goodwill have an autonomous meaning in 
international law, which is detached from domestic law. The third approach views 
the gate-provisions as a composite array of regulatory layers and norms that must 
be articulated to determine the availability of a protective framework or certain 
advantages arising from it in a given case. The articulation approach can be seen 
as a refinement of the previous two approaches to the extent that it takes into 
account a thicker – yet necessary and more realistic – layer of gate provisions. It 
therefore operates in addition to rather than instead of either one of the other 
approaches.  
B. In what follows, we discuss the features and, more importantly, the 
implications of these three approaches by reference to relevant instruments 
and cases. Delegation: how deferent are IIAs? 
1. Overview 
The rationale underpinning the delegation approach is simple. International law 
neither purports nor can be expected to address the detail of all types of 
transactions. In fact, in many cases, it deliberately relies upon domestic law to 
become operational.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  See Grosse Ruse-Khan, above n. 3, at 7; Klopschinski, above n. 3, at 194-201. 
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Major examples in the practice of international law include the granting of 
nationality,12 the determination of the baselines from which the territorial sea and 
exclusive economic zone are measured,13 or the determination of the content of an 
environmental impact assessment for activities with potentially significant 
transboundary impact.14  
But the type of delegation that can be derived from this rationale may vary. In 
order to spell out the two main forms that we encounter in practice, it is useful to 
bear in mind the second distinction introduced in section II above (i.e. according 
to whether the IIA makes no mention of IPRs, or only a general reference, or a 
specific reference, or a referral to domestic law). 
2. The referral model 
The most complete form of delegation, a full referral or renvoi, is rarely found at 
a definitional level. Under this model, domestic law does not play a 
supplementary role addressing matters not covered by international law; it plays a 
controlling role, whereby international law contains a referral that makes its 
content variable depending on the state of domestic law. One potential illustration 
is provided by Article 1(a)(iv) of the Benin-Ghana BIT, signed in 2001 and not 
yet in force, which defines the term ‘investment’ as ‘every kind of asset and in 
particular [ … ] intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes and 
know-how and all similar rights recognized by the national laws of both 
Contracting Parties’.15  
Under such a formulation, recognition by domestic law is a constitutive 
element of the existence of an ‘investment’. The referral does not operate to 
determine what investments are ‘protected’, as will be discussed later in 
connection with legality clauses, but to identify what rights or assets constitute an 
‘investment’.16 The practical difference between the two understandings is that, in 
the latter case, a change in domestic law may exclude the characterisation of an 
asset as an ‘investment’ whereas, in the former case, not any type of illegality 
(material/immaterial, initial/subsequent) may be sufficient to deprive an 
investment from the protection of the treaty at the jurisdictional/admissibility 
stage and, depending on the circumstances, the illegality question may be 
addressed at the merits stage.17  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  See e.g. Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment (6 April 1955), ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4, at pp. 20-21. 
13  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (‘UNCLOS’), Article 5, 
and Robin Churchill, ‘Coastal waters’, in David Attard, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Norman Martinez Gutierrez (eds.), The 
IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law, vol I : The Law of the Sea (Oxford Unniversity Press, 2014), at 3, 
footnote 8. 
14  See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.  Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14, para. 204-205. 
15  Illustration given in UNCTAD, above n. 4, at 3-4.  
16  This distinction is not always clear-cut in practice. A commentator refers to two cases where the tribunals excluded 
from protection certain assets because a condition required by domestic law (to which the relevant agreement made a 
renvoi) was not met. See Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press, 
2009), referring to Philippe Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award (27 November 2000), and Yaung 
Chi Oo Trading Pte. Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN ID Case No. ARB/01/1, Award (31 March 
2003). The unfulfilled condition, e.g. a governmental approval, may be considered to exclude the characterization of 
an asset as an ‘investment’ or, more accurately in our view, it may operate to exclude the ‘protection’ of the treaty to 
transactions/assets that can nevertheless be investments. In the latter case, the nature of the transaction/asset is not in 
question, only the extent to which is benefits from protection under the treaty. 
17  See the discussion of recognition as legality later in this article. 
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Another caveat concerns the respective roles of domestic and international law 
in a referral situation. In a referral situation, domestic law is controlling. An 
investment that does not qualify as such under domestic law will not qualify as an 
investment under the treaty. To continue with the illustration above, if domestic 
law does not recognise unregistered trademarks, then such trademarks (with the 
possible exception of ‘well know trademarks’) will not constitute an investment 
under Article 1(a)(iv) of the Benin-Ghana BIT, even if they are seen as IPRs 
abroad.  
An additional question is whether such a referral would have a limiting effect 
in that it would prevent the investor from claiming that the unregistered trademark 
and the investment underpinning it constitute an investment under a different 
paragraph of the same provision. The practical answer to this question is that a 
tribunal would, in all likelihood, accept such an argument, unless it can be 
inferred that the will of the parties was to protect IPRs only to a limited extent.18  
3. The reliance model 
The preceding conclusion moves the analysis to the second, far more frequent, 
form of delegation, which is best described as reliance. As a general matter, 
international law does not regulate the same relationships as domestic law. 
Exceptionally, there may be overlaps (e.g. between a human rights treaty and 
constitutional human rights, or between the definition of a given crime in 
international and domestic criminal law) but, aside from such specific areas or 
questions, international law does not purport nor can be expected to provide a 
comprehensive regulation of the horizontal relations between private persons (e.g. 
contractual- or tort-based relations or business associations). Such matters remain 
the province of domestic law.  
The definition of different forms of tangible and intangible property is an 
important example for our discussion. Indeed, the definition of what constitutes a 
property right is a matter for which international law relies on domestic law.19 The 
specificity of the reliance model as compared to the referral model is that, under 
the former, international law delegates the characterisation of an asset or a 
transaction to domestic law but retains its final characterisation as an 
‘investment’. 20  For analytical purposes, it is useful to recall the distinction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Definitions of investment are generally not drafted as closed or ‘exhaustive’ enumerations, but that depends, of course, 
upon each treaty. See Rudolf Dolzer, Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), at 63. On the qualifications that can be introduced in such definitions, with an impact on the 
IPRs, see section D below. 
19  See Higgins, R., ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law’ (1982) 176 RCADI 
263, at 270 (Higgins does not explicitly mention here the reference by international law to domestic law for purposes 
of defining property but, more generally, she considers that property cannot be defined otherwise than by reference to 
domestic law and general principles of law). More recently, Douglas (above n. 16, at 56) refers to EnCana 
Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award (3 February 2006), para 184. Dolzer and 
Schreuer (above n. 18), recognise that ‘[m]any of the transactions take place under the local law’ (at 288) and that ‘if 
the definition of an investment in treaties refers to rights governed by the domestic law of the host state [ … ] the 
existence of an investment will depend upon an examination of the relevant national law’ (at 64). 
20  As noted by Dolzer and Schreuer (above n. 18) ‘the international tribunal will take into account the understanding of 
the law by the organs of the host state and may defer to this understanding. But the final ruling falls to the international 
tribunal’ (at 64). Douglas (above n. 16, at 72) reasons, by reference to the case-law of the ECtHR, that the definition of 
investment is to be treated autonomously. Sornarajah also seems to consider that IIAs define IPRs autonomously, M. 
Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 13. 
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between treaties that specifically refer to IPRs (or specific forms of IPRs such as 
patents) and treaties that only make general references to ‘investments’ or 
‘property’ or ‘intangible property’. 
Where a treaty specifically refers to an IPR or a form thereof as an investment, 
the delegation rationale would naturally lead to the conclusion that the existence 
or not of such IPR (e.g. a patent) depends upon the domestic law of the host State. 
Thus, if a patent requires registration under domestic law and such registration has 
not (yet) been made, then the investor will not be able to claim that it holds a 
‘patent’ in the meaning of the treaty list. The asset held by the investor may 
qualify as some other form of investment (e.g. know-how) if allowed under the 
applicable investment provisions but it will not be a patent. Conversely, if it is 
registered, it will be a patent and therefore it will qualify as an investment 
irrespective of whether or not a patent is conceptually an investment (i.e. whether 
or not it involves a financial contribution, a certain duration, a risk element and so 
on21). The effect of this ‘safe harbour’ offered by the inclusion of the term ‘patent’ 
is that all the limitations entailed by patents under the domestic law on which 
international law relies will be automatically incorporated into the treaty regime. 
This point may be important in connection with the revocation of patents or other 
limitations of the scope of IPRs. An apposite hypothetical can be derived from a 
pending case. Eli Lilly, a major US pharmaceutical company, initiated an 
investment complaint under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)22 challenging a Canadian Federal Court decision to invalidate two 
patents obtained by Eli Lilly in Canada. The claimant refers inter alia to NAFTA 
chapter 17 (IPRs), the TRIPS Agreement, and the laws of the United States and 
Mexico (Canada’s NAFTA partners) to argue that the way the requirement of 
‘utility’ of patents is understood under Canadian law is in breach of the NAFTA. 
Specifically, the claimant argues that the breach arises from the interpretation of 
this requirement by Canadian courts since 2005. If one understands Canadian 
domestic law as meaning the relevant provisions of domestic law as interpreted by 
the proper judge, i.e. Canadian courts,23 then relying on the ‘safe harbor’ (i.e. the 
inclusion of patents in the treaty provisions defining the term ‘investment’) would 
prevent the claim from proceeding, as the very concept of patent would cover 
neither non-useful inventions nor the assets that are entirely dependent on the 
existence of a patent. This is, of course, a hypothetical illustration, as Article 1139 
of NAFTA, defining the term investment, does not mention ‘patents’ specifically. 
But the reference gives a better idea of the legal implications for cases involving 
IIAs which specifically mention ‘patents’ or other IPRs. The absence of a 
reference in Article 1139 explains why the claimant in Eli Lily v. Canada has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  This may not always be the case. As suggested by chapter 9 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (available at: 
https://ustr.gov), even when an asset is listed in the provision defining investment, it may still need to have the 
conceptual characteristics of an investment to qualify as an investment. For example, the terms ‘licence, authorisations, 
permits and similar rights’ are listed in Article 9.1. letter (g). However, footnote 4 states that ‘[whether a particular 
type of licence, authorization, permit or similar instrument [ … ] has the characteristics of an investment depends on 
such factors as the nature and extent of the rights that the holder has under the Party’s law’. Thus, listing may or may 
not, according to the terms of the treaty, be automatically equated to qualifying as an investment. 
22  North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 296 (‘NAFTA’). 
23  In accordance with generally accepted principles of international law, the courts of the country of grant of a patent 
enjoy exclusive jurisdiction to address issues of invalidation. See International Law Association, Intellectual Property 
and Private International Law, First Report, Sofia Conference (2012), pp. 5-6. 
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attempted to characterize its investment broadly, referring to ‘rights’ and 
‘intangible property’,24 which leads us to the next question.  
For treaties that do not refer specifically to IPRs, the legal situation is different. 
In such cases, the treaty will rely upon domestic law (i) to determine the defining 
features of the rights held or claimed by the investor (whether they constitute 
IPRs, or another form of property, or an authorisation, or a sales transaction, etc.) 
and, on this basis, (ii) to determine whether these features meet the requirements 
to qualify as an ‘investment’ under the treaty. Here, there is no ‘safe harbour’. The 
question of whether the asset is indeed an ‘investment’ remains to be debated by 
the parties. An IPR may be considered as such by domestic law and, yet, 
depending on its features, not constitute an ‘investment’ for the purpose of the 
treaty (e.g. lack elements of financial contribution, time, risk, etc.). In Eli Lily v. 
Canada, the respondent has not challenged the characterisation of the assets at 
stake as an investment (Article 1139) for jurisdictional purposes.25 
Thus, reliance on domestic law performs two different roles depending on 
whether the treaty makes a specific reference or not to IPRs. Such a difference can 
be easily illustrated by selecting an extreme example. If a treaty lists a mere sale 
of goods as an example of ‘investment’, it will suffice to characterise the 
transaction as a sale of goods under domestic law to consider that it is an 
investment. Conversely, if the treaty only makes general references to property or 
intangible property, the delegation to domestic law will be relevant to understand 
the key features of the transaction which, once understood as a mere sale, will in 
all likelihood be deemed not to be ‘property’ or an ‘investment’. An intermediate 
possibility, closer to the latter hypothesis, is illustrated by the TPP, which contains 
a list referring to licences, authorisations, permits, etc., but conditions their 
acceptance as ‘investments’ upon the very features of these objects (financial 
contribution, time, risk) as shaped by domestic law. 
From a practical perspective, this difference may be important for IPRs 
because, depending on the circumstances of the transaction, an IPR may be 
interpreted as a mere protection to export goods into a major market (analogous to 
an authorisation to commercialise) rather than as an investment. Indeed, a 
producer of good x who is based in State A may seek a patent for good x in State 
B in order to protect its exports there. If the investment treaty expressly refers to 
patents as investments, then the producer may be able to bring an investment 
claim against State B. At the same time, while using a specific IPR reference in a 
treaty as a ‘safe harbour’ may be useful for the asset to qualify as an investment, 
the effect may be that all the limitations on the scope of IPRs contemplated in 
domestic law will be imported into the IIA. Conversely, if the treaty only makes 
general references to intangible property, the producer’s contention that its patent 
in State B qualifies as an investment in State B will have to overcome the 
counterargument that it operates as a mere regulatory permit and, therefore, it is 
not an investment.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Eli Lilly v. Canada, above n. 2, Claimant’s memorial, para 163.  
25  Eli Lilly v. Canada, above n. 2, Respondent’s Counter-memorial, para 209. 
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The latter point can be illustrated by reference to Apotex Inc. v. United States 
of America.26 Although this case does not raise specifically issues relating to 
IPRs, as it concerns the issuance of marketing approvals for two generic drugs in 
the USA, a useful analogy can be made nevertheless. Apotex alleged a violation 
of investment protection standards under NAFTA Articles 1102 (national 
treatment), 1105 (fair and equitable treatment) and 1110 (expropriation without 
fair compensation). The tribunal declined jurisdiction concluding inter alia that 
the allegedly harmed ‘intangible property’ was not an investment under Article 
1139 of NAFTA, as it merely consisted of applications to obtain approval by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the commercialisation of drugs 
produced abroad (in Canada).27 This is also relevant for the assessment of whether 
patent applications can be considered as ‘investments’ when they are not 
specifically mentioned in the relevant provisions. This is particularly the case if 
one considers that such applications may not qualify as ‘investments’ even when 
the expenditures in securing them have been incurred in the host State.28 As 
discussed next, a similar reasoning would apply to the characterization of 
‘investment’ under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
4. Delegation and Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention 
One significant implication of the delegation approach concerns the availability of 
the ICSID arbitration system, the gates of which are guarded by Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention. There has been significant controversy as to the proper 
interpretation of the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1).29 Although, initially, a 
largely autonomous conception of this term prevailed limiting access to 
jurisdiction even when the investment in question qualified as such under the 
applicable BIT,30 a number of decisions have signalled the possibility of a 
different understanding.31 It would be inaccurate to state that the initial approach 
is no longer being followed or that a new trend has emerged. For better or for 
worse, one major feature of investment jurisprudence is a low level of consistency 
among different decisions, at least on some questions. But this is not the place to 
open such a vast debate.32 Our focus in this article is on the implications of 
following the delegation approach for purposes of Article 25. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  Apotex v. United States, above n. 2. 
27  Ibid., para 188 (italics added). 
28  Award, para 193 (italics added). 
29  See Schreuer, C., L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch and A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention. A Commentary (2nd edn., 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 106-141. 
30  The most influential precedent in this regard is Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (31 July 2001), para 52, setting out the so-called ‘Salini test’. 
31  According to Dolzer and Schreuer, the most elaborate criticism of the ‘Salini test’, paving the way for an interpretation 
of the term investment in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention in a manner more deferent to the State parties to the 
applicable IIA, is the decision of the ad hoc committee in Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/10, Decision on the application for annulment (16 April 2009) (‘Malaysian Salvors – Annulment’). Although 
the main bone of contention was the fourth criterion of the Salini test, i.e. the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State, the critique addressed more generally the autonomous character of the definition of 
investment in Article 25 (see para 62-63, 69, 71-72). Dolzer and Schreuer acknowledge, however, that the decision 
was not unanimous. 
32  See Frank Spoorenberg and J. E. Vinuales, ‘Conflicting Decisions in International Arbitration’ (2009) 8 The Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 91; Pierre Mayer, ‘Conflicting Decisions in International Commercial 
Arbitration’ (2013) 4 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 407. 
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Generally speaking, consistency can be sought at different levels, ranging from 
the entire body of investment jurisprudence, to those cases concerning the same 
investment treaty, to the more specific level of a single case calling for the 
application of several instruments. A delegation approach, particularly under a 
referral model or a deferent reliance model, would be effective to ensure 
consistency from the level of domestic law, to that of the applicable BIT, to the 
interactions of the latter with Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. If the term 
‘investment’ in this provision is interpreted by reference to what the contracting 
parties agreed in the IIA and such agreement refers or relies on domestic law to 
characterise the nature of an asset, the chain going from a locally registered patent 
to its recognition as an investment for Article 25 purposes would stand. On the 
contrary, the less reliant each regulatory layer is on the subsequent one, the more 
important the obstacles that must be overcome to align domestic law, the BIT and 
the ICSID Convention will be. To use the extreme example referred to above, an 
IIA may include a mere sales of goods – to be characterised according to domestic 
law – as an investment, but such transaction is unlikely to meet the requirements 
of an autonomous interpretation of Article 25.33 
However, if consistency is sought at a broader level, whether that of a given 
IIA or of the ICSID Convention, more autonomy in the definition of ‘investment’ 
could lead to a higher degree of consistency across different cases. This result 
assumes, of course, that arbitral tribunals pay due regard to the autonomous 
concept of ‘investment’ rather than (mis-)using autonomy to neglect the intention 
of the parties to the IIA.  
Thus, depending on what treatment of the term investment in Article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention eventually prevails, and particularly on whether a 
relatively autonomous definition is preserved, the delegation model may have 
significant implications for the admission of different forms of assets in ICSID 
arbitration. As far as IPRs are concerned, the key question is whether such rights 
would meet the requirements of an autonomous definition of investment, a 
question that will be discussed in the next section. 
C. Autonomy: how independent are IIAs? 
1. Overview 
The rationale underpinning the autonomy approach is composite. In the relations 
between domestic and international law, autonomy is based on the rule granting 
international law priority over domestic law34 and the ensuing corrective or 
controlling character of international law.35  
In the relations between two international norms, a non-hierarchical variation 
of the first rationale stems from two other considerations, namely the degree of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Sales of goods are generally not seen as investments either under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention (see 
Malaysian Salvors – Annulment, above n. 31, para 69; and Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, 
Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11, Award (1 December 2010), rejecting the claim under Article 41(5) of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules as manifestly without legal merit) or under IIAs (see Romak S.A.(Switzerland) v. The 
Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA280, Award (26 November 2009), para 242). 
34  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 27. 
35  See e.g. Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award 
(17 February 2000) (‘CDSE v. Costa Rica’), para 64-65. 
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self-sufficiency displayed by some treaty-regimes and, more prosaically, the need 
to interpret the terms of a norm or a treaty in accordance with its own wording 
and purpose. An example of this rationale is provided by the oft-asserted 
autonomy of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention with respect to the definition 
of investments in the relevant BITs.36 
From a legal perspective, the main analytical task is to clarify the legal 
implications of considering provisions in IIAs (or Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention) defining investment as autonomous rather than as a delegation 
(under either the referral or reliance model). As in the previous section, we will 
first discuss the more extreme form of autonomy, i.e. the potential creation of 
IPRs by IIAs, and then move to a more moderate – and frequent – one, autonomy 
understood as conceptual independence. Finally, we discuss the implications for 
the operation of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
2. Creation of IPRs? 
At the outset, it must be noted that there is no authority for the proposition that 
IIAs create new IPRs that would not exist under domestic law. But the question 
has been raised by the references found in many IIAs to assets such as ‘goodwill’, 
‘know-how’ or ‘technological processes’, which are not generally recognised by 
IPR law as IPRs. More generally, the question concerns the extent to which IIAs 
expand the protection offered to recognised IPRs by other treaties, particularly 
IPR treaties and FTAs. 
Analytically, the first question to be addressed is what does it mean for an IIA 
to create an IPR? There are different degrees to which a right can be said to be 
created by an international instrument. The most complete form would be a 
directly enforceable right recognised at the international level irrespective of its 
recognition in domestic law. Although the references in the practice of 
international courts and tribunals are seldom clear cut, one potential illustration is 
given by how the ICtHR has interpreted the right to property provided in Article 
21 of the American Convention.37 In a series of cases starting with the Awas 
Tingni decision, the Court has developed a detailed conception of the 
requirements arising for States in connection with the right of indigenous and 
tribal peoples to their property.38 A summary of such requirements and of their 
level of detail is provided in the Sawhoyamaxa case.39 In casu, the domestic law of 
Paraguay recognised the title of indigenous peoples to their traditional lands, but 
there are several indications that the Court understood its conclusions as 
autonomous and, as a result, a State would be held to such requirements 
irrespective of the contents of its domestic law, including the obligation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  See above n. 30. 
37  American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (‘ACHR’). 
38  Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, ICtHR Series C No. 79, Judgment (31 August 2001). For an 
overview see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their 
Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, doc 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 56/09, 30 December 2009. See also Oneryildiz v. Turkey, ECtHR Application no. 48939/99, 
Judgment (30 November 2004), para. 124-129. 
39  Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, above n. Error! Bookmark not defined., para. 128. 
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‘formally and effectively convey’ the relevant land to the Sawhoyamaxa 
community.40  
The preceding case also provides an illustration of a second understanding of 
the ‘creation’ of rights, namely when the relevant international norm creates an 
obligation for the State to specifically enact a framework recognising a new right 
or entitlement.41 This is what we called, in section II, a ‘vertical’ obligation. An 
illustration of this scenario is provided by obligations – common in the FTA 
practice of the United States and the European Union – to join the UPOV 
Convention, which in turn requires States parties to enact a sui generis form of 
intellectual property protection tailored to the specificities of new plant varieties.42 
A third – far broader – understanding of the term ‘creation’ would merely 
require a State to provide some level of protection to certain assets. Using the 
term ‘creation’ to refer to this hypothesis is an obscuring oversimplification. 
Providing for an obligation to protect certain objects is not the same as creating a 
specific entitlement that benefits from a specific type of protection. The system of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes the parties’ sovereign rights 
over their genetic resources and protects them against ‘bio-piracy’ (by requiring 
prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms for access), but it does not 
create new forms of property.43 Similarly, foreign goods and even some services 
may benefit from a given level of protection in accessing the territory of a State 
party to a trade agreement but the recognition of such entitlements cannot be 
equated to the ‘creation’ of new forms of property. In both cases, the protection 
afforded is best described as a ‘horizontal’ inter-State obligation. 
The next question is: which of the preceding meanings of ‘creation’ best 
describes the situation of IIAs with respect to IPRs? As mentioned above, there is 
no authority for the proposition that IIAs ‘create’ entitlements if such creation is 
understood in either the first or the second form. This is clearly acknowledged by 
legal commentators.44 At the same time, it is unquestionable that IIAs offer some 
protection to assets/transactions that qualify as protected investments. 
Analytically then, it is only by a rather loose use of language that IIAs could be 
said to ‘create’ IPRs. A more appropriate terminology would state that IIAs may 
‘protect’ IPRs, which leads us to a different understanding of autonomy, namely 
an autonomous level of protection (accorded by investment disciplines) granted to 
an autonomously defined concept. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  The operative part of the ruling required Paraguay to ‘adopt all legislative, administrative and other measures 
necessary to formally and physically convey to the members of the Sawhoyamaxa community their traditional lands, 
within three years’, ibid., operative part, para 6.  
41  See ACHR, above n. 37, Article 2, and ibid., operative part, para 12.  
42  See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of December 2, 1961, as revised at Geneva 
on 10 November 1972, 23 October 1978 and 19 March 1991 (‘UPOV Convention’), Article 30, available at: 
www.ecolex.org (TRE-001119). A list of relevant laws appears on the UPOV website: 
http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/ (visited on 23 June 2015). 
43  Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79, Articles 15 and 8(j). See, more specifically, Nagoya 
Protocol on access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their utilization 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 October 2010, Articles 6 and 7, available at : 
http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf (visited on 23 June 2015). Of note is the wording in 
Article 6(2) according to which : ‘each Party shall take measures, as appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that the prior 
informed consent or approval and involvement of indigenous and local communities is obtained for access to genetic 
resources where they have the established right to grant access to such resources’ (italics added). 
44  See e.g. Grosse Ruse-Khan, above n. 3, at para. 1 (referring, however, to the exception of EU trademark and design 
rights). 
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3. Conceptual independence 
The autonomy of a concept can be legally understood as something more than 
reliance (delegation to domestic law while international law retains the final 
characterisation) without going as far as asserting either the direct creation of new 
forms of property or the obligation to effect such creation. In this model, 
autonomy means conceptual independence or, more specifically, the assertion of a 
general definition of certain IPRs, which would be the same for all cases relating 
to the same treaty or even all treaties referring to them, irrespective of how the 
domestic law of the host State defines a given right.  
The main difference between the reliance and conceptual independence models 
lies in the extent to which domestic limitations to IPRs are taken into account. By 
way of illustration, in the aforementioned case opposing the American 
pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly to Canada, one point of contention is the 
interpretation given by Canadian courts to the ‘utility’ requirement in patent 
registration. Under a reliance model, the utility of an invention is to be assessed 
under the domestic law of the place of registration. An invention that does not 
meet the utility requirement under such a law will not qualify as a patent. It may 
still be argued that the amounts invested in securing exclusivity rights for a given 
invention qualify as ‘intangible property’ under Article 1139 and, hence, are an 
‘investment’ for NAFTA purposes, as both parties to the dispute seem to agree, 
but it will not be a patent (and cannot expect, as it is not entitled to, protection as a 
patent). By contrast, under a conceptual independence model the requirement of 
‘utility’ will be given a general characterisation, which may not correspond to the 
understanding given in the domestic laws of the host State or their interpretation 
by domestic courts. Such a model seems indeed to underpin the claimant’s 
references to the understanding of ‘utility’ in international IPR law as well as in 
the domestic laws of the United States and Mexico, Canada’s NAFTA partners.45  
The practical implications of this difference should not be underestimated. An 
invention that does not qualify technically as an IPR must be shown to be an 
‘investment’ under the applicable treaty, which as discussed previously is not 
necessarily obvious given the nature of IPRs. In addition, whereas an 
unrecognised IPRs may qualify as an investment, it does not follow that the 
protection enjoyed by such ‘investment’ will be the same as that enjoyed by IPRs, 
i.e. as monopolies. Specifically, whereas the holder of an asset recognised as an 
IPR may claim that the host State breaches its investment obligations if it does not 
grant or protect the abnormal legal monopoly associated with IPRs ownership, 
mere investments – including unrecognised IPRs – cannot easily claim to be 
protected as monopolies under investment disciplines. Thus, gaining jurisdiction 
comes at a prize at the merits phase. If an asset is not defined as, say, a ‘patent’ 
for jurisdictional purposes then there is no clear basis to claim that it must be 
protected as ‘patents’ are, i.e. through a grant of abnormal exclusivity rights to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  Eli Lilly v. Canada, above n. 2, Claimant’s memorial, para 145-160. Specifically, Eli Lilly has argued that the 
interpretation of the utility requirement under the ‘promise-doctrine’ applied by the Canadian court was established 
after its ‘investment’ was made and that that its expectations were allegedly frustrated by the introduction of this 
requirement. The ‘promise-doctrine’ applies when the applicant promises in the specification that the claimed 
invention would have a certain utility; it does not have to be demonstrated but only soundly predicted at the time of the 
patent application.  
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detriment of competitors. Regulation (or de-regulation) that places the product 
under normal market conditions would, in fact, be only natural and no breach (e.g. 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard) could be reasonably claimed. 
Conversely, when there is a valid patent, the State would have the obligation to 
distort competition by granting a monopoly to the patent-holder as well as the 
means to prevent patent infringement. Thus, to claim a breach of an investment 
discipline because exclusivity rights have been denied, the asset must be 
construed not just as a mere investment but as a patent (or another IPR), if not 
under domestic law at least under a general and autonomous definition of a patent. 
This is why a conceptual independence model provides investors both better 
insulation and potentially a more specific type of protection than a reliance model. 
The general understandings on which a conceptual independence model is 
based could be derived from different sources, including the domestic laws of 
different countries – not only the host State – but also relevant treaties and 
agreements, as suggested in the argumentation of the claimant in Eli Lily v. 
Canada. However, the problem when it comes to IPRs lies in the fact there is no 
general understanding of the concepts of patent, trademark, or copyright law 
arising from international law. International treaties on IPRs only contain some 
elements that contracting parties need to incorporate into their domestic laws. 
Moreover, there are many differences in how patentability standards (which 
determine whether a patent will be granted or not) are defined and applied.46 
Thus, IPRs lack a general definition or understanding capable of giving 
independent content to the terms of IIAs. This view is in line with the territorial 
nature of IPR protection systems. Furthermore, and consistently with the rationale 
of the autonomy approach, there would have to be evidence that the intent of the 
IIA contracting parties was to rely on a general understanding of the term ‘IPR’ or 
‘patent’ rather than on the one arising specifically from the host State’s laws. 
Alternatively, the reference to such general understandings (assuming ratio 
arguendi they indeed existed) would have to be established by other interpretation 
principles (e.g. teleological or contextual interpretation). As suggested by the 
foregoing considerations, the conceptual autonomy model rests, as far as IPRs are 
concerned, on thin legal grounds. 
In practice, to avail itself of the insulation provided by the conceptual 
independence model, the claimant would need to establish (i) that conceptual 
independence is the appropriate frame to interpret the applicable IIA (here, it is 
important not to conflate such model with the reliance model, which has a much 
more solid grounding in international law), and (ii) the existence of a general 
understanding of the relevant IPR. In addition, in the context of an ICSID 
arbitration, it would also have to establish that such understanding falls within the 
autonomous definition of investment under Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.  
4. Autonomy and Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  See, e.g., Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, ‘Evaluating Flexibility in International Patent Law’ (2013) 65 Hastings Law 
Journal 153, at 178; Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents: developing a public 
health perspective, Working Paper, WHO, ICTSD and UNCTAD, available at  
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js21419en/ (visited on 3 July 2015). 
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The autonomy approach has significant practical and policy implications for the 
operation of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention and, more generally, for the 
debate on consistency of investment jurisprudence.  
It is easy to understand why adopting the autonomy approach for the 
interpretation of the term investment in Article 25(1) may lead to inconsistencies 
between what the IIA on which consent is based views as an investment and what 
qualifies as such under Article 25(1). An important line of investment arbitration 
awards has affirmed the conceptual independence of the term ‘investment’ in 
Article 25(1), often expressed through the so-called ‘Salini test’,47 with regard to 
definitions included in IIAs. In some cases, this position has led certain tribunals 
to decline jurisdiction over an investment dispute.48  As noted earlier, other 
tribunals have, instead, departed from such a position and followed a delegation 
approach under which Article 25(1) would refer or rely on the characterisation of 
investment given by the IIA.49 Depending on the approach followed, the legal 
implications for the protection of IPRs under IIAs will be different.  
At the level of a specific case, an autonomous approach may raise an obstacle 
to the protection of IPRs to the extent that these would need to be characterised as 
investments in accordance with the requirements of the autonomous definition of 
investment in Article 25(1). These requirements for the existence of an investment 
vary somewhat from one case to another and some of them (e.g. the contribution 
of the investment to the development of the host State) are not uniformly 
accepted.50 But the main point remains, namely that the operation of these 
requirements may limit the availability of ICSID arbitration for the protection of 
IPRs, whether these are expressly or implicitly recognised as investments under 
the relevant IIA.  
Friction between the ICSID Convention and some IIAs may give the 
impression that the autonomy approach favours inconsistency. However, this 
conclusion depends on the level at which the search of consistency is conducted. 
At the broader level of the entire body of ICSID jurisprudence, an autonomous 
interpretation of the term investment in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention 
may provide some degree of consistency in respect of the admissibility of claims 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  See above n. 30. For a recent illustration see OI European Group B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/11/25, Award (10 March 2015), para 216, 229-231. 
48  One notable case is Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award (17 May 2007), 
which declined jurisdiction based on an objective understanding of the term investment in Article 25(1)(para 54-55), 
and was subsequently annulled, although debatably so and with a dissenting opinion of one of the ad hoc committee 
members. Another notable case, characterised by two commentators as the ‘high water mark’ in the application of the 
Salini approach (Dolzer and Schreuer, above n. 19, at 72), is Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/5, Award (15 April 2009). In paragraph 114 of its Award (which declined jurisdiction) the tribunal 
identified six criteria that need to be present for a transaction/asset to qualify as an investment under Article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention. Although, debatably, the tribunal brought into this definition two criteria that would more 
appropriately belong to an assessment of legality (i.e. that the investment is made in accordance with the laws of the 
host State and in good faith), the reasoning is rigorous and complete (discussing not only the ICSID Convention and 
the applicable BIT but also general international law). 
49  See e.g. Malaysian Salvors – Annulment, above n. 31; Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/16, Award (8 November 2010), para 314; Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. and Others (formerly Giordano Alpi and 
Others) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (8 February 
2013), para 462. 
50  See e.g. Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award (14 July 2010), para 108-111 
(upholding the view that Article 25(1) entails an objective definition of investment but excluding the ‘contribution to 
the host State development’ as part of it). 
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based on IIAs in relation to IPRs and, more generally, to a variety of investment 
forms recognised expressly or implicitly in IIAs. But absolute consistency is 
neither an end it itself nor necessarily a superior option. Indeed, consistency may 
lead to undesirable outcomes if tribunals disregard domestic laws concerning 
when and under which conditions intangible property is protected as an IPR. In 
addition, ICSID jurisprudence is only one part of the broader body of investment 
arbitration jurisprudence and these other types of proceedings, which are often 
made available by arbitration clauses (particularly ad hoc arbitration under 
UNCITRAL rules), are not subject to the filter of Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.  
As discussed next, in practice, the delegation or the autonomy approaches are 
seldom adopted in a ‘pure’ or clear-cut fashion. More frequently, a more complex 
articulation of different regulatory layers filters the extent to which IPRs, as well 
as other assets and transactions, can benefit from the protection provided by IIAs. 
D. Articulation: protected IPRs as a composite legally-defined object 
1. Overview  
The set of provisions that govern whether – and to what extent – IPRs can benefit 
from the protection offered by IIAs is of a composite nature, combining not only 
definitional provisions in IIAs but also domestic law and other treaty norms that 
condition the availability of the protective framework. Assets qualifying as 
investments under the relevant IIA may not, whether as a result of their very 
nature or due to the factual circumstances of the case, qualify as ‘protected’ 
investments. Recalling the fourth distinction made in section II above, these 
provisions do not operate as treatment standards (i.e. assessing whether a 
protected investment has been treated as required by the IIA); the intervener 
earlier by circumscribing the province of ‘protected’ or ‘covert’ investments, as 
distinguished from non-protected or non-covert investments.51 In other words, the 
gates of IIA have not yet been crossed. 
These provisions are important for the analysis of IPRs because these rights 
present specificities that may be captured by the additional layer of filtering 
organised by such provisions. By way of illustration, if the investment on research 
and development (R&D) of a pharmaceutical product or a seed or in the 
branding/marketing campaign of a product has been made abroad (typically in the 
home State), IPRs recognised as such by an IIA should not be considered as 
investments ‘in the territory’ of the host State. Similarly, even if IPRs were to be 
viewed as conceptually independent from domestic law (under the autonomy 
approach) or as investments (under the reliance model of delegation) they may 
still not be investments ‘in accordance with the domestic laws’ of the host State 
for a variety of reasons not related to their definitional features (e.g. ranging from 
corruption and bad faith to the absence of a health or environmental authorisation 
required for the introduction or commercialisation of a product). In some cases, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  For an overview see J. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 166-176 
(although this author refers to limitations on the ‘definition’ of investment). 
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even broader norms protecting transnational public policy may come into play to 
exclude the protection of a controversial technology.52  
The practical importance of these provisions is underscored by their use in the 
arguments made by the parties in recent or pending IPR-related investment 
claims. From an analytical standpoint, these provisions are not always easily 
distinguishable from the definition of investment. Indeed, whether an investment 
is ‘in the territory’ of the host State may be implicit in the fact that only 
‘enterprises’ with a sufficient presence in such territory qualify as ‘investments’ 
and IPRs are only assets ‘possessed’ by such enterprise-investments. In some 
other cases, the very nature of an IPR (e.g. patents or industrial models, but not 
well known trademarks) may require to be made ‘in accordance with domestic 
law’ to be at all protected or, more precisely, to even exist as legal entities in the 
host State. Still, in other cases, an investment may be excluded from protection by 
virtue of a provision carving it out from an investment discipline.  
The picture that arises from this thicker layer of ‘gate provisions’ is therefore 
more blurred. It is halfway between the definition of investment and the 
requirements for an investment to be protected. In order to avoid, as much as 
possible, giving a blurred picture of a blurred reality, in what follows, we 
introduce a distinction between, on the one hand, ‘gate provisions’ operating at 
the level of the definition of investment, i.e. ‘entreprise-based’ definitions, and, on 
the other hand, those provisions excluding from ‘asset-based’ definitions of 
investment some assets, typically because of their location or their reception by 
the domestic law of host States. 
2. Enterprise-based definitions of investment and IPRs 
An enterprise-based definition of investment requires the establishment or 
acquisition of an enterprise in the host country to give rise to investors’ rights. 
This corresponds to the conventional concept of ‘foreign direct investment’ (FDI). 
The assets owned by such enterprise, as defined by the IIA, are part of – in fact 
they are owned by – the protected investment.  
The entreprise-based approach would not allow the right-holder of IPRs to 
claim investors’ rights in a country where it has not established or acquired an 
enterprise, thereby limiting the possibility of using IIAs as a basis to challenge 
national decisions on the validity or enforceability of IPRs. This approach is 
suggested as one option in the Model BIT of the Southern African Development 
Community (‘SADC Model BIT’),53 which notes that ‘Investment is perhaps the 
most controversial and critical issue to define. The definition will determine 
which foreign capital flows will be covered by the Agreement.’54 This option in 
the SADC Model BIT spells out the concept of ‘enterprise’ and lists, among the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  On this concept and its operation see Pierre Lalive, ‘Ordre public transnational (ou réellement international) et 
arbitrage international’ (1986) 3 Revue de l’arbitrage 329. An English translation of this study appeared as P. Lalive, 
‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration’, in ICCA Congress Series 1987 no. 
3; World Duty Free Company Limited v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, para 
138-139. 
53  SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary, 2012, SADC Model BIT, available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf (visited on 23 June 2015). 
54  Ibid., at 12.  
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assets that an enterprise ‘may possess’, copyrights, know-how, goodwill and 
industrial property rights such as patents, trademarks, industrial designs and trade 
names, ‘to the extent they are recognized under the law of the Host State’.55 The 
last phrase may be relevant in different situations that will be further discussed in 
the following section.  
A variant of the enterprise-based approach, which may generate a scope of 
protection narrower than the one just described, has been incorporated into the 
Indian Model BIT (2015).56 The adoption of an enterprise-based definition of 
investment marks a major difference with respect to the assets-based definition 
contained in the Indian Model BIT of 1993. This change reflects a growing 
criticism about the way in which BITs have worked in India, which has signed 83 
of such agreements.57 Seventeen foreign investors brought multi-billion claims 
under existing BITs in response to various regulatory measures adopted by the 
Indian government, such as cancellation of telecom licences and imposition of 
retrospective taxes.58 Yet, it has been reported that most foreign investment so far 
originated from the US and Canada, with which no BITs have been signed.59 In 
accordance with the new Indian Model BIT, ‘investment’ means ‘an Enterprise in 
the Host State, constituted, organised and operated in compliance with the Law of 
the Host State and owned or controlled in good faith by an Investor’ (Article 1.6). 
An ‘enterprise’, in turn, must have ‘its management and real and substantial 
business operations in the territory of the Host State’. This requirement is further 
clarified ‘[f]or greater certainty’ by stipulating that ‘real and substantial business 
operations’ require an enterprise to have, without exception, all the following 
elements: ‘ma[ke] a substantial and long term commitment of capital’ and 
‘engag[e] a substantial number of employees in the territory of the host State’, 
‘assum[e] entrepreneurial risk’ and ‘mak[e] a substantial contribution to the 
development of the Host State through its operations along with transfer of 
technological know-how, where applicable’ (Article 1.2.1). These conditions 
reflect to some extent, the aforementioned ‘Salini test’ developed under ICSID 
jurisprudence. 
The narrowing down of the scope of protected investments under the new 
Indian Model BIT has clear implications regarding IPRs. The mere acquisition of 
such rights would not be allowed to ‘cross the gates’ guarded by such provisions. 
Any acts affecting the validity or enforceability of patents, trademarks, etc. would 
not provide sufficient ground for an investment claim, unless the right-holder has 
established an enterprise that meets the requirements mentioned above. In 
particular, compliance with the condition requiring a contribution to development, 
along with transfer of technological know-how, would be difficult to prove if the 
acquisition of IPRs is not followed by the local exploitation of the IPR in the 
Indian territory. Even if an enterprise were established, the nature of its activities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  Ibid., at 9. 
56  Model text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, 2015, available at : https://mygov.in (visited on 23 June 2015). 
57  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96 (visited on 23 June 2015). 
58  See Prabhash Ranjan, ‘India and Bilateral Investment Treaties—A Changing Landscape’ (2014) 29 ICSID Review 419. 
59  See Kavaljit Singh, ‘India and bilateral investment treaties – are they worth it?’, available at: 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/01/21/guest-post-india-and-bilateral-investment-treaties-are-they-worth-it/ 
(visite don 23 June 2015). 
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would determine, in the last instance, whether an IPR may constitute a protected 
investment. Thus, a foreign subsidiary undertaking mere distribution activities 
would not satisfy that requirement; even a manufacturing facility may not do so, if 
it fails to comply with the development test ‘along with transfer of technological 
know-how’. 
In summary, the enterprise-based approach offers a model that may minimize 
the use of IIAs to challenge measures of the host country that may affect the 
integrity or use of IPRs, unless the right-holder has established an enterprise and 
the investment complies with other requirements that may be established, in line 
with the Salini test, or other elements provided for in the IIA. The Indian Model 
2015 represents a reaction to the increased reference to IIAs as a means to shield 
foreign investors from State regulatory action.60 
3. Asset-based definitions of investment and their qualification 
3.1. Examples of a qualified asset-based approach 
Many BITs have included a general asset-based definition to determine what a 
protected investment is, accompanied by a list of covered assets. However, the 
inclusion of an asset in the list does not automatically qualify it as a protected 
investment, where the IIA provides for additional conditions that need to be met 
in order for treaty protection to be available. This approach may lead to a scope of 
protection broader than the enterprise-based approach, as the presence of an 
enterprise in the host State is not an explicit condition for an asset to be protected, 
but still narrower than the scope created by other options where such conditions 
are not spelled out.61  
One early reference to the qualified asset-based approach was suggested during 
the negotiation of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).62 A proposal 
was made then to include an interpretive note indicating that in order to qualify as 
an investment, certain characteristics had to be present, such as the commitment 
of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit or the assumption of 
risk.63 Such qualifications would have the effect of bringing the notion of ‘asset’ 
closer to that of ‘enterprise’ without of course equating both (notably, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  The increase in investment claims has led certain countries not to renew or to exit BITs. See e.g., Martin Khor, ‘Global 
Trends: Investment treaties come under fire’ (2012) Third World Network, available at : 
http://www.twn.my/title2/FTAs/info.service/2012/fta.info.239.htm (visited on 23 June 2015). 
61 The BIT between Switzerland and Uruguay invoked by Philip Morris to challenge the tobacco ‘plain-packaging 
legislation’ of Uruguay - which restrains the use of the claimant’s trademarks - is based on a non-exhaustive list of 
‘assets’, including ‘trade or service marks’ (article 1(2)(d)). No qualification is made in the treaty regarding what 
characteristics such assest should present to be protectable. In its Decision on jurisdiction on the pending arbitration 
between Philip Morris and Uruguay, the tribunal dismissed Uruguay’s defense that there was lack of contribution, or 
rather, negative contribution to the economic development of the country. In the view of the tribunal, ‘the four 
constitutive elements of the Salini list do not constitute jurisdictional requirements to the effect that the absence of one 
or the other of these elements would imply a lack of jurisdiction’ (Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Abal Hermanos S.A. v. 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 July 2013, para 206). If the 
listed assets that constitute an investment are not qualified by certain characteristics, purely asset-based definitions 
may open the possibility of claims grounded on the nullification or impairment of IPRs, even in the absence of any 
effective presence or assumption of risk in the country where investment protection is sought. This kind of broad 
provisions would have to be avoided by countries wishing to prevent investment claims in cases where IPRs are 
merely used to control an export market without any contribution of capital, local value added or job creation. 
62  See the OECD website for further information on this initiative: www.oecd.org (visited on 23 June 2015). 
63  See Manfred Schekulin, ‘Scope of the MAI: Definition of Investor and Investment’, in Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment State of Play as of February (Paris: OECD, Paris, 1997), at 12. 
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requirement of management and/or real substantial operations in the host State is 
not present).  
Another possible illustration is provided by the definition of investment in the 
NAFTA. In accordance with Article 1139 ‘investment’ means, inter alia, ‘real 
estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used 
for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes (Article 1139 (g)’. 
Although IPRs are not specifically mentioned, they could be encompassed by the 
reference to ‘intangible’ property. Prima facie, the requirements set out by this 
provision would be easily met, as IPRs are generally acquired with ‘the 
expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit’. Indeed, the 
monopolistic rights conferred by an IPR, such as a patent, would normally allow 
the right-holder to charge prices above the marginal cost and to obtain an extra-
ordinary profit. 64  However, Article 1110(7) of the NAFTA introduces a 
qualification according to which the expropriation clause: 
‘does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property 
rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that 
such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual 
Property)’. 
An investor may bring a challenge on the basis of another provision of Chapter 11 
(e.g. Article 1105) but, as discussed earlier in this article, it would need to prove 
that the right invoked constitutes an ‘investment’ in the meaning of Article 1139. 
A third, more recent, illustration is provided by the definition of investment in 
the US Model BIT 2012.65 This instrument defines ‘Investment’ as: 
‘every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of 
an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the 
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take 
include: [ … ] (f) intellectual property rights’ (Article 1). 
The Model follows the NAFTA approach with respect to the carve-out introduced 
into the expropriation clause. Like article 1110(7) of NAFTA, Article 6.5 of the 
Model states that the provision on ‘Expropriation and Compensation’: 
‘does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property 
rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of 
intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is 
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement’. 
This specific reference to IPRs clearly goes beyond NAFTA in two ways, namely 
the reference to the TRIPS Agreement and the specific mention of IPRs as 
investments which, as already noted, are not expressly mentioned in Article 1139 
of the NAFTA. While the various components of IPRs are not spelled out in the 
commented Model BIT, they may be deemed to cover a broad range of items. For 
instance, if the coverage of the TRIPS Agreement were to be taken as a reference, 
it would include copyright and related rights, designs, trademarks, geographical 
indications, patents, integrated circuits’ designs, undisclosed information and test 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  See e.g. F.M. Scherer, Patents: Economics, Policy and Measurement (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005). 
65  The text is available at : https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf (visited on 
23 June 2015). 
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data relating to pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals.66 Yet, the mere acquisition of 
any of these rights would not to meet per se the conditions relating to ‘the 
commitment of capital or other resources’ or ‘the assumption of risk’. Firstly, the 
costs incurred in the registration of an IPR, such as a trademark or patent are 
normally a small or insignificant proportion of the income that the right-holder 
may obtain by shielding a particular market from third parties’ competition. In the 
case of some IPRs, such as copyrights and know-how, as well as designs and 
trademarks in some countries, no registration is needed to obtain protection.  In 
addition, IPRs allow the right-holder to exploit a protected market through 
exports; IPRs do not require the establishment of an enterprise or local 
manufacturing to be valid or enforceable. What is known as the ‘working 
obligation’ under patent law does not oblige a patent-holder to industrially exploit 
a patent in the country of grant; it only exposes it to the risk of issuance of a 
compulsory license in favour of a third party in case of non-working.67 Secondly, 
the acquisition of IPRs does not imply the assumption of any risk. Even when 
registration is required, the applicant does not expose its capital to any loss. It 
simply asserts rights against third parties who would be thereafter excluded from 
the use of the protected subject matter. It may be concluded, hence, that a patent 
or trademark or other IPR does not constitute a protected investment in the 
absence of other qualifying factors.  
At this level, two more specific difficulties arise, whether in the context of the 
NAFTA, the US Model BIT 2012 or elsewhere, relating to the ‘location’ of the 
investment and its ‘reception’ in domestic law. 
3.2. ‘Location’ of the investment  
As suggested by the foregoing discussion, an important question is whether the 
mere acquisition of IPRs in a host State gives rise to a protected investment, 
independently of the way such rights are put to use in that territory. If, for 
instance, such rights were used to merely protect imports, that is, if the right-
holder has not developed the IPR-protected technology in the host State or it has 
not even a manufacturing facility in it, could an investment claim be brought? 
While there are no precedents directly addressing this issue, the rulings in some 
analogous investment cases suggest that the acquisition of an IPR as such would 
not necessarily be a protected investment under the terms of treaties such as the 
NAFTA or other similarly drafted IIAs. More may be needed. Specifically, a 
stronger link between the territory of the host State and the R&D investment 
leading to the development of the IPR or, at least, the manufacturing activities 
based on the IPR would have to be present.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  See TRIPS Agreement, above n. 7, Article 1.2. Trade names, although not explicitly referred to in the TRIPS 
Agreement have also been considered as subjet to its disciplines in the WTO ‘Havana Club’ case (DS176: United 
States — Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998). The TRIPS Agreement does not specifically mention 
plant variety protection (although Article 27.3(b) requires some form of protection for such varieties) and utility 
models. 
67  Only a limited number of patent laws currenty provide for compulsory licenses in such circumstances. In the XIXth 
century, however, a patent could be revoked in some countries (e.g. France) if it was not industrially worked in the 
country. See e.g., M. Halewood, ‘Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licences 
at International Law’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 243, at 252. 
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Such matters of location were addressed in at least three NAFTA cases. The 
first illustration is provided by Bayview v. Mexico, 68  where the US based 
claimants argued that the diversion by Mexico of the waters of the Rio Grande 
River amounted to a breach of NAFTA Chapter 11. This argument supposed that 
water rights held by the US claimants in the US territory could constitute a 
protected investment under NAFTA. However, in a submission made before the 
tribunal on the basis of Article 1128 of NAFTA, the United States government 
itself argued against this proposition.69 Eventually, the tribunal concluded that 
such water rights were not protected under Article 1101 of NAFTA. The tribunal 
noted, in this regard, that:	   
‘in order to be an ‘investor’ within the meaning of NAFTA Art. 1101(a), an enterprise must make 
an investment in another NAFTA State, and not in its own. Adopting the terminology of the 
Methanex v. United States Tribunal, it is necessary that the measures of which complaint is made 
should affect an investment that has a ‘legally significant connection’ with the State creating and 
applying those measures. The simple fact that an enterprise in a NAFTA State is affected by 
measures taken in another NAFTA State is not sufficient to establish the right of that enterprise to 
protection under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: it is the relationship, the legally significant connection, 
with the State taking those measures that establishes the right to protection, not the bare fact that 
the enterprise is affected by the measures’ 70 
Closer to the hypothesis under consideration in this article is the approach 
followed in Grand River Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, where the tribunal 
refused to consider the existence of an ‘investment’ in the host State (the US) on 
the grounds that claimants manufactured cigarettes at Grand River’s plant in 
Canada for export to the United States.71 As a result, the tribunal found that ‘such 
activities and investments by investors in the territory of one NAFTA party do not 
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for a claim against another NAFTA 
party’.72  
The third illustration takes us another step closer to the area of IPRs. In the 
already mentioned Apotex v. United States case, the tribunal declined jurisdiction 
inter alia on the grounds that: 
‘Apotex’s actual development and manufacture of generic drugs, all its activities in relation to both 
its sertraline and pravastatin products take place outside of the United States (including, inter alia, 
the development, manufacture; processing; testing; packaging; and labelling of each drug) [ … and 
… ] Apotex’s products, once manufactured outside the United States, are then exported by Apotex 
to United States-based distributors’.73  
The tribunal further observed that: 
‘Apotex could, of course, have invested in U.S.-based manufacturing, development, or testing 
facilities, but opted instead to create and manufacture its generic pharmaceuticals in Canadian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  See Bayview Irrigation District v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1, Award (19 June 2007) 
(‘Bayview v. Mexico’). 
69  The United States Article 1128 Submission states that: ‘[a]ll three NAFTA Parties thus agree that the scope and 
coverage of NAFTA Chapter Eleven is restricted to investors of a NAFTA Party that are seeking to make, are making 
or have made investments in the territory of another NAFTA Party’, Submission of the United States of America, 27 
November 2006, para. 14, available at: http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Texas/TexasClaimsMexico-
USA_1128-Jurisdiction.pdf (visited on 23 June 2015). 
70  See Bayview v. Mexico, above n. 68, para. 101. 
71  Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award (12 January 2011), para. 85-
89. 
72  Ibid., para 5 (of the initial summary contained in the award). 
73  Apotex v. United States, above n. 2, para. 146. 
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factories [ … ] It follows that Apotex’s formulation, development, and manufacture of the 
pharmaceuticals in issue does not qualify for the purposes of NAFTA Chapter Eleven’.74  
In summary, in the tribunal’s view, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is not intended to 
protect a company’s activities as a foreign exporter of goods into the territory of a 
NAFTA Party.75 The same reasoning would apply in a case where a patent, 
trademark or other IPR were not associated with a presence in the host country 
that could be qualified as an investment.  
The stance taken in Apotex v. United States is important for the interpretation 
of IIAs that contain definitions of investment based on or equivalent to those 
contained in the NAFTA or, to some extent, the US Model BIT. Governmental 
measures affecting the validity or enforceability of IPRs would not necessarily 
provide sufficient grounds for an investment claims in the absence of other factors 
that locate the activities underpinning an IPR (e.g. R&D or manufacturing) within 
the territory of the host State.  
3.3. ‘Reception’ of the investment in the host State’s domestic law 
3.3.1. General observations 
Another important question relating to the protection of IPRs concerns their 
reception in domestic law. The way in which such ‘reception’ is envisioned under 
the ‘articulation’ approach and, specifically, under a qualified asset-based 
definition of investment, is more fine-grained than under either the ‘delegation’ or 
the ‘autonomy’ approaches. Rather than ‘legality’ as such, it is the ‘reception’ in 
the domestic law of the host State that must be analysed. ‘Reception’ includes 
both matters of ‘legality’ (i.e. whether an investment has been made ‘in 
accordance with domestic law’) and questions relating to the ‘recognition’ (i.e. 
with or without registration) of different IPRs in a domestic legal system.  
The two are of course closely related. There may be situations where a certain 
subject-matter is off-protection in the host country while it is protected in the 
home country of the investor or elsewhere. And such situations may arise for a 
variety of ‘legality’ or ‘reception’ based reasons, e.g. when the IPR-holder has not 
claimed its rights in the host country, when the IPR has expired or has been 
revoked, or when the subject-matter is deemed not protectable in the host 
country.76 Since IPRs are of territorial nature, the subject matter that is not 
protected in a given country belongs to the public domain there; it cannot be 
deemed an asset owned or controlled by a juridical or natural person, even if such 
person holds rights in other jurisdictions.  
This said, from an analytical perspective, it is useful to distinguish the 
‘recognition’ and ‘legality’ inquiries. As a matter of reasoning, the recognition 
inquiry must be addressed first, as the requirements imposed by a domestic 
legislation to register a given IPR (reception as legality) suppose that such rights 
need registration in the first place. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74  Ibid., para. 175-176. 
75  Ibid., para. 143. 
76  For instance, if the host country does not grant patents on plants, in accordance with the exception allowed by Article 
27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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3.3.2. Reception as recognition 
Understanding reception as recognition is important because some IPRs, such as 
copyright and trade secrets, do not require, registration to be acquired and 
enforced. The lack of registration does not seem to affect the status of such rights 
as covered investments, at least when they are specifically listed in a definitional 
clause. Conversely, patents, trademarks, industrial designs, utility models and 
other IPRs can only be acquired, through a registration process, upon application 
by the interested party. The right is conferred once the application is processed 
and approved.77 Within the context set by this distinction, two peculiar cases call 
for further scrutiny.  
First, although trademarks must as a rule be registered, well-known trademarks 
benefit from an exception and receive protection without prior registration.78 
Some IIAs have not only confirmed this exception but also expanded it beyond 
the TRIPS standard, by incorporation of the WIPO's Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks (1999).79  
The second case concerns registration applications. Given that some IPRs 
(patents, trademarks, industrial designs) require registration, a registration 
application creates a mere expectation of obtaining an exclusive right and, 
eventually, a profit, if it is effectively exploited. However, some applications may 
be traded and, in some countries, they generate rights even before grant, for 
instance, to obtain a retrospective compensation for the unauthorized use of the 
subject-matter by a third party. Although it is clear that a still unregistered 
invention, mark or design is not an IPR, it might be argued that the application is, 
in any case, ‘intangible property’, as long as it is ‘owned’ and can be sold to third 
parties. Some investment agreements (e.g. Canada-Argentina BIT, 1993) refer in 
the definition of ‘investment’ to ‘rights with respect to patents’ (Article 1 
(a)(iv))80 rather than to  ‘patents’. The US-Jamaica BIT refers to ‘patentable’ 
inventions (Article I.1.(a)(iv)).81 The question arises whether this type of wording 
could be understood as covering inventions which are potentially patentable in the 
host country but for which a patent has not yet been obtained. While there has 
been no investment case that specifically addresses this issue, in Apotex v. United 
States the tribunal considered whether applications for the marketing approval of 
pharmaceuticals filed by Apotex constituted a protected investment under 
NAFTA Chapter 11. Apotex had submitted Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
(ANDAs) for two products (sertraline and pravastatin) which were not approved 
by the Food and Drug Administration, despite the efforts that Apotex made to 
obtain US courts’ decisions in support of its applications. Apotex alleged a 
violation of the principles of national treatment and fair and equitable treatment, 
and the expropriation of the property rights in its ANDAs. It had the initial burden 
of proving that the issue fell under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, that is, that its 
applications actually constituted a protected investment. It articulated several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77  Depending on the type of IPR and the national law, a substantive examination to establish compliance with substantive 
standards is necessary to obtain registration. 
78  See TRIPS Agreement, above n. 7, Article 16.2. 
79  The text is available at : http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf (visited on 23 June 2015). 
80  The text is available at : http://www.bilaterals.org/?canada-argentina-bit-1993 (visited on 23 June 2015). 
81  The text is available at : http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1726 (visited on 23 June 2015). 
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arguments to establish the jurisdiction of the NAFTA tribunal on the case, 
including that it had made significant investments to prepare and file its 
applications and also to commercialise its products once the FDA would have 
granted approval. As already noted, the tribunal declined jurisdiction. With 
respect to the specific issue of ANDAs, it reasoned that: 
‘whilst an ANDA may be characterised for certain purposes as “property”, the Tribunal does not 
consider that the nature of an ANDA is such as to fall within the contemplated scope of NAFTA 
Article 1139(g), as that provision must be understood as a whole, by reference to the objects and 
purposes of NAFTA Chapter Eleven. Notwithstanding its very substantial nature, and the time and 
cost required for its compilation, an ANDA, ultimately, remains simply an application for 
revocable permission to (in this case) export a product for sale (by others) in the United States. 
Even if, as a technical matter, the application may be “owned”, unlike Apotex’s approach, the 
Tribunal does not consider that NAFTA Article 1139(g) can be approached by divorcing the 
concept of “property” from its context, and applying it in the abstract’82 
It seems logical to extend the tribunal’s reasoning in this case to applications for 
IPRs, which can be revoked and, more fundamentally, also rejected by the 
competent authority when the prescribed requirements are not met. Even if 
considered as ‘property’,83 such applications would still have to meet the other 
qualifications to be deemed a protected investment under the enterprise-based or 
the asset-based approach (e.g. the location requirement discussed above). In the 
absence of other factors, the mere refusal of an application could not as such 
provide a basis for an investment claim. 
3.3.3. Reception as legality  
Moving now to the analysis of reception as legality, a key question is whether 
IPRs that qualify as investments for definitional purposes benefit from protection 
under the applicable IIA in a variety of hypotheses out of which two deserve 
closer scrutiny, namely when a State intervention is expressly excluded from the 
scope of a provision and when an investment has not been ‘made in accordance 
with domestic law’ as required by a clause in the IIA. 
Regarding the first case, as mentioned earlier in this article, some treaties 
including the NAFTA and US Model BIT 2012 explicitly exclude certain 
governmental interventions from the ‘Expropriation and Compensation’ clause 
stating that the latter: 
‘does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property 
rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of 
intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is 
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement’.84 
Although the operation of such exclusions has not been addressed yet in the 
investment law jurisprudence, it is worth noting that the wording ‘does not apply’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  Apotex v. United States, above n. 2, para. 207. 
83  Differences between common and continental law should be noted in this regard, since under the latter property rights 
are subject to the principle of ‘numerus clausus’ and could not be properly invoked in relation to an application to 
obtain an IPR or other right. 
84  Article 6.5. of the Model BIT is based on the wording of Article 1110(7) of the NAFTA, according to which the 
‘expropriation and compensation’ clause: ‘does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to 
intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that 
such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property)’. 
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strongly suggests this provision is not intended as an ‘exception’, in the technical 
meaning of a provision justifying what would otherwise be a breach, but rather to 
clarify that the host State’s IPR-related measures (whether administrative or 
judicial) falling under this carve-out (whether administrative or judicial) cannot be 
challenged under this provision unless a breach of the TRIPS Agreement (for the 
Model) or of Chapter 17 of the NAFTA (for the NAFTA) is ascertained. The 
latter reference is however problematic as it seems to require an assessment of an 
external norm or a different chapter by investment tribunals. Such an assessment 
raises the question of whether the tribunal has indeed the power to take a stance 
on this issue and, if yes, at what stage of an investment proceeding. Depending on 
the scope of a jurisdictional clause, a tribunal may have more or less leeway to 
take on claims for breach of norms other than those explicitly formulated in the 
treaty (e.g. a counterclaim for breach of domestic law). Where the jurisdictional 
clause is narrow, such as in the NAFTA, it seems clear that a tribunal cannot 
assess a breach of an external law as an independent head of claim.85 What is less 
clear is whether the proof of such inconsistency necessarily requires a decision 
from the appropriate body (e.g. a NAFTA Chapter 20 panel for breaches of 
Chapter 17 or the WTO Dispute Settlement Body for breaches of the TRIPS), 
which can only be triggered by a State party, or whether the investment tribunal 
may consider the consistency of a conduct with respect to such a norm as a matter 
of applicable law for the analysis of the head of claim for which it would have 
jurisdiction. In the latter solution is adopted, that may move the operation of the 
IPR carve-out from its proper place, i.e. at a jurisdictional stage of an investment 
proceeding, to a subsequent phase. Of course, a tribunal could decide to have the 
consistency with the TRIPS Agreement or NAFTA Chapter 17 litigated at the 
jurisdictional level with the claimant carrying the burden of proving 
inconsistency. But, in practice, the proof of inconsistency may entail not only 
questions of law but also questions of fact leading the tribunal to merge 
jurisdiction and merits. The rule remains, however, that when ‘inconsistency’ can 
at all be raised, it must be dealt with at the jurisdictional level and the claimant 
carries the full burden of proving such inconsistency. As we shall see next, 
matters relating to the appropriate stage at which an argument must be addressed 
also arise in the operation of ‘in accordance with’ clauses. 
A number of investment treaties subject the definition of protected investments 
to their conformity with the laws of the host State.86 As a result, domestic IPRs 
laws may have an impact on whether an investment is protected.87 Most tribunals 
have considered that such a reference to the host State’s laws concerns the validity 
of an investment and not the definition of the term investment itself. As noted by 
the tribunal in Salini v. Morocco, the provisions in BITs requiring the conformity 
of the investments with the host State’s laws refer ‘to the validity of the 
investment and not to its definition. More specifically, [such provisions seek] to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  See e.g. Jorge E. Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), at 92-94. See also Eli Lilly v. Canada, above n. 2, Canada Statement of Defence, para 83-85. 
86  See e.g. Egypt—Pakistan BIT (2000), art 1(1); Bahrain—Thailand BIT (2002), art 2, reproduced in A. Joubin-Bret, 
‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’ in A. Reinisch (ed.) Standards of Investment 
Protection (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 17.  
87  Ibid., 19. 
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prevent the Bilateral Treaty from protecting investments that should not be 
protected because they would be illegal.’88 In Fraport v. Philippines, the tribunal 
made a distinction which is now generally accepted – despite its some lack of 
clarity – between initial and subsequent illegality, considering that, whereas the 
latter could only operate as a defence on the merits, the former could potentially 
limit jurisdiction.89 This was so irrespective of whether the investment had been 
accompanied by some explicit agreement with or communication from the host 
State,90 as even where the host State had issued an authorisation, a potential 
estoppel argument could be dismissed if the arrangements making an investment 
illegal were covert.91 That was, as a matter of fact, the conclusion of the tribunal 
in this case.92 A question that arises in connection with IPRs is whether in cases 
where an investor has received a license to invest but the IPRs on which, e.g., the 
manufacturing plant is based, are not recognised by the domestic law or are 
revoked. Specifically, is domestic IPR law part of the ‘domestic law’ relevant to 
assess legality ab initio? We believe the answer should obviously be affirmative 
as the entire investment transaction cannot be deemed to be ‘made’ unless the IPR 
is validly granted. Yet, some tribunals have, perhaps for fact-specific reasons, 
concluded that only the laws on foreign investment are relevant to assess legality 
ab initio.93 This position has been criticized as being too restrictive.94 Our view is 
that IIAs are not only about investment ‘protection’ as the tribunal seems to 
assume. More generally, IIAs are not meant to totally deprive the State from its 
power to regulate admission to operation through a variety of statutes and 
regulations. It would be unreasonable to consider that because an investor 
receives one permit (e.g. license to invest in the host State) it is automatically 
entitled or has a reasonable expectation to receive all remaining approvals, which 
depend on very different requirements (e.g. registration of an IPR, environmental 
permit to operation, banking license, license to exploit an oil well, etc.). And until 
all the necessary permits to start operation have been obtained, can an investment 
be reasonably considered to be made? If an investor decides to set up a 
manufacturing plant before obtaining an IPR (or another form of approval, such 
an FDA approval), that is only one step – and risky one from a business judgment 
perspective – towards making the investment. The investor may still claim that its 
investment was made irrespective of the IPR registration, but such an argument 
has a price: it concedes that the initial investment could not expect to be protected 
in the abnormal form of a monopoly and, thereby, while it may gain jurisdiction it 
will loose in terms of the level of protection required and, of course, the potential 
damages claimed. This simple conceptual issue, the meaning of ‘made’, has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88  Salini v. Morocco, above n. 30, para 46. 
89  Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award 
(16 August 2007) (‘Fraport v. Philippines’), para. 345. The award was subsequently annuled but the distinction 
remains relevant: Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment (17 December 2010) (‘Fraport Annulment’), para 218-247.  
90  (‘Fraport v. Philippines’), above n. 89, para 343. 
91  Ibid., para 346-347.  
92  Fraport v. Philippines,  above n.88, para 404. 
93  Saba Fakes v. Turkey, above n. 50, para 119. 
94  See S. Manciaux, ‘Chronique des sentences arbitrales’ (2011) 138 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 565, at 581. 
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widely overlooked despite its importance for the operation of legality clauses as 
filters or gate-provisions regulating access.  
4. Concluding remarks: what is the best approach? 
The foregoing analysis of gate-provisions and the way they regulate whether and 
the extent to which IIAs offer protection to IPRs can now be stated in a concise 
and formalised manner. Figure 1 shows the three approaches, each with its 
possible models: 
 
Figure 1: Understandings of gate-provisions as they relate to IPRs 
 
Approaches Related models 
Delegation Model 1 : Referral 
Model 2 : Reliance 
Autonomy Model 1 : Creation of IPRs 
Model 2 : Obligation to establish IPRs 
Model 3 : Conceptual independence 
Articulation Model 1 : Enterprise-based definitions 
Model 2 : Qualified asset-based definitions (location/reception) 
Model 3 : Unqualified asset-based definitions (reception) 
 
The broad conclusions that arise from the analysis, as anticipated earlier in this 
article, are that the operation of gate-provisions as they concern IPRs is 
significantly different in each different approach and model. Such differences 
have been neglected so far in the analysis of gate-provisions, whether in 
connection with IPRs or with other potential forms of investment. Importantly, the 
approach/model followed is unlikely to be entirely set by pure drafting, as it 
would require wording that is too polarised to be easily agreed between parties, 
except of course in case of strong bargaining asymmetries. The interpretation of 
gate provisions is therefore key and, in order for practitioners not to be caught off 
guard when negotiating treaties or litigating disputes, a fine-grained cartography 
of models and implications may be useful.  
One practical example will help illustrate this point. Failing to distinguish the 
‘delegation/reliance’ model from ‘autonomy/conceptual-independence’ may have 
important practical implications for a case such as Eli Lilly v. Canada. Indeed, 
whereas there is much authority for the proposition that international law is 
controlling on the question of what constitutes an investment (as discussed under 
the delegation/reliance model), that does not mean that patents or other IPRs have 
an autonomous meaning that prevails over the meaning and requirements (e.g. the 
utility requirement) set out in domestic law (as under an autonomy/conceptual 
independence model). Thus, references to ‘autonomy’ or ‘objectivity’ in 
investment jurisprudence must not be misinterpreted so as to smuggle purported 
‘implications’ (as to objective concepts of IPRs) that, on closer inspection, are not 
at all ‘implied’ in the controlling character of the definition of investment.  
Beyond the Eli Lilly v. Canada case, which is used here only as a hypothetical 
example, the main point remains. In contemporary international law, the approach 
enjoying most acceptance and authority is the delegation/reliance model. To 
further understand its operation – as a constant interaction of treaty drafting and 
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interpretation – it is important to go a step further and take into account a thicker 
layer of provisions, as under the articulation approach. The balance between the 
interests of investors and those of host States depends, indeed, on a wider set of 
treaty provisions addressing matters such as carve-outs, location and reception in 
domestic law. Enteprise-based definitions of investments and, to a lesser extent, 
qualified asset-based definitions condition the protection of IPRs to their 
embeddedness in a wider transaction, entailing a real presence and contribution of 
the investment (e.g. location in the form of R&D and/or manufacturing activities 
in the host State) as well as their reception in domestic law (both in terms of 
recognition and legality). Whereas unqualified asset-based definitions of 
investment condition protection to the recognition of IPRs in the host State’s 
domestic law, they require far less in terms of location. 
It is submitted then that an enterprise-based or, as a minimum, an adequately 
qualified asset-based definition of investment, interpreted from the perspective of 
a delegation/reliance model, offers the best options to formulate ‘gate provisions’ 
to deal with IPRs as protected investments. 
 
 
